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Below are the first 10 and last 10 pages of uncorrected machine-read text (when available) of this chapter, followed by the top 30 algorithmically extracted key phrases from the chapter as a whole.
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Computer Science and Telecommunications Board 500 Fifth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20001
Phone: 202 334 2605
Fax: 202 334 2318
E-mail: cstb@nas.edu
www.cstb.org
July 20, 2006
Lawrence Brandt
Program Director
Information Integration & Informatics (III) Cluster
Directorate for Computer and Information Sciences and Engineering
National Science Foundation
4201 Wilson Boulevard
Arlington, Virginia 22230
Dear Dr. Brandt:
With this letter report,1 the National Research Council's Committee on a
Framework for Understanding Electronic Voting (Appendix A) seeks to provide some
idea of the current state of readiness for electronic voting in jurisdictions across the
United States and to gauge what progress has been made since the publication of the
committee's 2005 report, Asking the Right Questions About Electronic Voting.2 This
second report of the committee is based on a May 2006 workshop that brought together
a number of knowledgeable and thoughtful local, state, and federal election officials
(Appendix B) who shared their perspectives and experiences with the committee.3
Presentations and discussions at the workshop made clear that many of the issues
1The preparation of this letter report was supported under National Science
Foundation Award Number IIS-0436133. However, in accordance with National
Research Council policy, the NSF did not review this report before publication, and the
opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication are
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the NSF.
2For more information, see National Research Council, Asking the Right
Questions About Electronic Voting, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C.,
2005. See also http://www.cstb.org/pub_evoting.html.
3The analysis, conclusions, and recommendations presented in this letter report
are the responsibility of the committee alone and should not be attributed to these
officials or anyone else. Furthermore, the justification for the committee's conclusions
and recommendations does not lie in a statistically valid sampling of the nation's voting
jurisdictions but is instead based on a mix of inputs. Testimony to the committee by the
officials listed in Appendix B was intended to put a human and contemporary face on
the nature of difficulties that jurisdictions are likely to face if problems arise in
conducting the November 2006 elections.
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discussed in Asking the Right Questions remain open and quite fluid as the nation
approaches the 2006 elections--these issues include reliability, usability, security,
training, education, and testing/certification.
The scope of this letter report is restricted to readiness for using electronic voting
systems, by which is meant the systems with which voters interact directly to cast their
ballots. Direct recording electronic (DRE) systems are the most obvious example, but
electronic voting systems also include optical scan systems. In these latter systems,
the voter marks his or her preferences on a physical paper ballot; the ballot is then read
by an optical scanner, and the vote is passed to a tabulation mechanism for counting.
This report is concerned primarily with readiness for the November 2006 elections,
rather than with longer-term issues. For a discussion of longer-term issues, the reader
is advised to consult Asking the Right Questions.
CURRENT STATUS OF PREPARATION FOR THE NOVEMBER 2006 ELECTIONS
On the basis of the testimony of the local, state, and federal election officials
present at the workshop, the expertise developed by the committee in preparing its
September 2005 report, and the experience and background of individual committee
members, the committee believes that some jurisdictions--and possibly many--may not
be well prepared for the arrival of the November 2006 elections with respect to the
deployment and use of electronic voting equipment and related technology, and anxiety
about this state of affairs among election officials is evident in a number of jurisdictions.
Several factors appear to contribute to this unease and concern:
· Compliance deadlines tied to the November 2006 elections that are required by
the Help America Vote Act (HAVA). Some states and jurisdictions have failed to
meet HAVA-mandated deadlines already, and others are likely to miss deadlines
tied to the November 2006 election (and thus will carry out the fall elections with
equipment and systems that are not HAVA-compliant), although it remains to be
seen what legal or political consequences, if any, will flow from these missed
deadlines. Other jurisdictions will meet HAVA deadlines in a technical sense but
may not be able to fulfill certain key HAVA objectives, such as increasing voting
booth accessibility for disabled voters or reducing the error rate in the ballots
cast.4 In still other cases, jurisdictions rushing to meet deadlines for HAVA
compliance might have done so in counterproductive ways, such as by buying
equipment that is not up to par, using software that may not be fully compatible
with existing applications, not becoming sufficiently familiar with vendor products,
and so on.
· State legislative activity. Entirely apart from HAVA, many states have imposed
additional requirements for election equipment and have set new requirements
for election procedures. For example, at least 26 states have passed laws
mandating that voter-verified paper audit trails (VVPATs) be provided for voting
4 Issues related to reducing voter error rates are discussed in Asking the Right
Questions, pp. 82-95.
2
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equipment that will be used in the November elections.5 For some of the states
that are using retrofitted DRE systems, the 2006 primary election represents the
first large-scale use of VVPAT-equipped voting systems.6 That is, the concept of
voter verification of votes cast on DRE systems has never been tested on a large
scale in any U.S. election, and the impact of this particular capability on election
results and public confidence in them has yet to be seen.
· Security. Security issues remain prominent in the public debate about voting
technologies.7 For example, even as the committee was meeting, concerns were
spreading about a new vulnerability discovered in one prominent vendor's
equipment.8 On June 27, 2006, New York University's Brennan Center for
Justice released a report focusing on security vulnerabilities in electronic voting
machines.9 Physical security was also discussed at the workshop--with one
official recounting the difficulties in providing adequate warehousing space for
her e-voting equipment, as well as concerns about how to transport such
equipment safely and securely.
· Vendor performance. Several workshop participants in contractual relationships
with two prominent vendors reported on nontrivial problems with poorly designed,
poorly tested, or poorly constructed e-voting equipment. For example,
equipment has been delivered with many sample defects, including such things
as sharp edges on machines and broken legs on machine stands. In other
cases, some vendors are meeting promises regarding delivery of equipment by
supplying for shared use equipment that has been used in other jurisdictions.
Such sharing has been possible when (primary) elections are held on different
dates, but this tactic obviously cannot be used on November 7, 2006.
· Poll worker availability.10 In some jurisdictions, the availability of trained poll
workers may be an issue in the fall. Some election officials at the workshop
5 See, for example, http://www.verifiedvoting.org.
6 A modern DRE system usually has a screen that displays the ballot to voters.
For accepting input, some have touch screens, while others use mechanical selection
devices. When the voter is finished voting, the voter takes some action in front of the
machine to finalize his or her ballot. When a VVPAT is attached to the system, the
voter has the opportunity to view a paper record of his or her vote that is then stored
with the system just before the finalization action is taken. See Asking the Right
Questions, pp. 39-42.
7 For more discussion of security issues, see Asking the Right Questions, pp. 57-
82.
8 See Monica Davey, "New Fears of Security Risks in Electronic Voting Systems,"
New York Times, May 12, 2006. Available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/12/us/12vote.html?ex=1305086400&en=5b3554a76aa
d524a&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss.
9 Brennan Center Task Force on Voting System Security, The Machinery of
Democracy: Protecting Elections in an Electronic World, Brennan Center, New York
University, New York, 2006. Available at
http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/downloads/Full%20Report.pdf.
10 See Asking the Right Questions, pp. 100-105.
3
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reported concerns that they will not be able to train enough poll workers in how to
use the new equipment for November, a prospect that they believe will result in
very long lines, excessive delays, and voter confusion if poll workers are unable
to answer questions about the new systems. Poll workers must be trained in
system setup and basic troubleshooting, as well as in answering questions that
voters are likely to have--and even poll workers with experience from past
elections may not be of much assistance to voters if they themselves are
unfamiliar with the electronic voting systems at their polling places.
· Voter education.11 For many voters, the November 2006 election will be the first
conducted with electronic voting systems. Election officials are concerned about
voter readiness to use these new technologies, as well as the related question of
citizen confidence in the newly deployed systems.
This set of observations is not intended to suggest that all jurisdictions are facing
these issues with the same concern and intensity. Indeed, perhaps the committee's
most salient impression as the nation approaches the fall elections is the wide variation
in the situations of the various jurisdictions, the consequences and implications of which
remain to be seen.
EMERGING FACTORS AND REALIZATIONS
As jurisdictions proceed along the path toward electronic voting in November
2006, a number of factors are becoming more apparent.
First, jurisdictions are becoming more aware of the cost implications of deploying
electronic voting systems, in particular, the fact that the initial acquisition cost of an
electronic voting system is only a fraction of the total life-cycle cost.12 Furthermore,
HAVA appropriations represent a one-time infusion of federal money to the states (most
of which has already been spent on equipment purchases),13 and no supplemental
funds are likely to be forthcoming from either the federal government or the states for
conducting elections. Thus, many jurisdictions are facing the November elections
without adequate financial resources to address the problems they see on the horizon--
problems including equipment testing; maintenance and storage; training of poll
workers; and voter education.
A second factor is that as some jurisdictions have learned for themselves about
the complexities of electronic voting, their relationships with e-voting equipment vendors
and service providers have become increasingly adversarial. For example, a number of
workshop participants reported that they have become more assertive in their dealings
with vendors and are less willing to accept what they believe to be shoddy work or
broken promises: some reported having developed more leverage and expertise in
negotiating contracts and terms with vendors. But other workshop participants reported
having problems with and less success in obtaining desirable provisions for contracts
11 See Asking the Right Questions, pp. 93-95.
12 See Asking the Right Questions, p. 97.
13 See Asking the Right Questions, p. 114.
4
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they were negotiating. Also, some workshop participants reported that colleagues from
smaller jurisdictions with fewer resources, and perhaps lacking the necessary legal,
technical, or contracting expertise to negotiate more favorable terms, simply accept the
standard vendor contract.14
Third, election officials are increasingly realizing the fundamental contradictions
between relying on current procedures and requirements for certifying voting system
software,15 on the one hand, and holding elections on fixed, immovable dates, on the
other.16 The fundamental reality of software is that problems can emerge after the
software has been certified and put into use, and some of these problems may be
serious enough to require fixing. However, ensuring that the installation of a fix does
not have other, unintended consequences (e.g., causing yet another problem) can be a
difficult process, and re-certification of modified software can be quite time-consuming.
Yet elections are held on the first Tuesday of November and are postponed only under
extraordinary and rare circumstances--and it is unlikely that the lack of certification for a
patched software system would be regarded by election officials as such an
extraordinary circumstance. Thus, in the event that problems are found after
certification, election officials must then choose between using certified systems with
known problems or using uncertified systems in which those problems may have been
fixed--and the latter may be regarded by some election officials as the lesser of two
evils.
A fourth factor is the extent and scope of vendor involvement apart from the sale
of equipment itself.17 For example:
· Workshop participants expressed considerable skepticism about current
certification processes for electronic voting systems,18 given the lack of an
arms-length relationship between the independent testing authorities (ITAs)
and the vendors. Rightly or wrongly, these concerns originate in the fact that
vendors pay the ITAs for undertaking certification.19 In addition, vendors have
opportunities to tune their software specifically for the tests in question, a
practice somewhat akin to studying for a test rather than learning the material
in a course. Lack of certification reform has also contributed to such
skepticism.
14The group of election officials assembled for this workshop agreed that their
jurisdictions have relatively greater access to resources than do most other jurisdictions
and thus are not necessarily representative of most jurisdictions across the nation. The
committee also noted that most voting jurisdictions in the nation are on the smaller side.
15Note that software is used in electronic ballot marking systems and electronic
tabulation systems, and both generally require certification.
16See Asking the Right Questions, pp. 110-114.
17See Asking the Right Questions, pp. 120-122.
18See Asking the Right Questions, pp. 110-114.
19The mere fact that a vendor pays for a testing procedure should not itself be
damning. For example, Underwriters Laboratory has provided product certification for
many years. Although product manufacturers pay for the testing and certification
process, UL certification has some notable credibility in the marketplace.
5
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· In some cases (involving both DRE and optical scan systems), vendors are
responsible for generating the various vote counts that emerge from an
election--a function that has traditionally and historically been an inherently
governmental function. Although election officials continue to have ultimate
responsibility for the integrity of an election even when privatized vote
counting is in place, vendors with profit-making motives have high incentives
to cut corners and to refrain from incurring costs in resolving disputed votes.
· Electronic voting equipment is complex and thus requires considerably more
training to operate (especially with respect to troubleshooting issues).
Vendors are thus necessarily involved in training efforts for election personnel
and poll workers.
Fifth, several workshop participants commented on the incompleteness of testing
of electronic voting equipment by vendors and ITAs, which--by assumption--do not
address needs or issues that are specifically local. For example, paper trails attached
to voting systems must be generated by a printer. Often these printers use thermal
paper--but voting records printed on thermal paper may not last as long as is required
by local law. Some officials at the workshop noted that they would have preferred to
undertake their own testing but that resource constraints (money, personnel, and time)
prevented them from doing so. Given the complexity of systems, the quantity of
patches, and the variety of ballot positions and configurations to test, it is not clear that
electronic voting machines can be adequately tested before being deployed.
Sixth, election jurisdictions vary widely in their knowledge and expertise
regarding electronic voting.20 Those with less knowledge about technology or with less
experience in contracting with technology vendors clearly operate at a disadvantage in
preparing for the November elections, and a lack of technology background or
contracting experience regarding assessments of quality, performance, and reliability
can increase the influence of politics and personal relationships in the procurement
process. Election officials in such jurisdictions could benefit from their more
experienced colleagues in learning about problems associated with the products of
different vendors, solutions to such problems, jurisdiction-appropriate contract
provisions, backup procedures and contingency plans, and law and regulation. In
addition, it is simply a fact that, viewed in the large, electronic voting systems are a
relatively new arrival on the election scene, and few jurisdictions can claim to have a
great deal of experience with such systems.
Finally, advocacy groups have gained considerable influence in the debate
regarding electronic voting. Many of these groups focus on security issues21 and play
an increasingly important role in focusing public attention on the conduct of elections
and in stimulating state legislative action intended to mitigate security risks.
20See Asking the Right Questions, p. 118.
21For a more extended discussion of security issues raised by some advocacy
groups, see Asking the Right Questions, pp. 57-82.
6
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RECOMMENDATIONS
As the November 2006 elections approach, the committee's first and most urgent
recommendation is that election jurisdictions should--indeed must--ensure the
availability of backup mechanisms and procedures for use in the event of any
failure of e-voting equipment or related technology. This recommendation is based
on the fact that any "flash" cutover to new technology (such as we are seeing today with
many e-voting systems) almost guarantees surprises and unintended consequences
(e.g., system crashes, unacceptably slow performance). And, although unlikely if
appropriate pre-election testing has been undertaken, election officials would be unwise
to completely ignore the possibility of problems severe enough to prevent the effective
use of the entire system for some period of time on Election Day.
Most organizations have learned the hard way that it is necessary to develop,
test, evaluate, and iterate with small-scale prototypes before committing themselves to
an organization-wide program of technology upgrade. They have also learned that they
should plan on the simultaneous availability of both old and new systems for some
period of time, so that failures in the new system do not leave them unable to perform
their mission.
Mostly as the result of resource constraints, most election jurisdictions are not
(and have not been) in a position to ask vendors for small-scale testing of prototypes in
an operational environment before committing to large-scale deployment. Accordingly,
jurisdictions must have backup and contingency plans in place that anticipate a wide
range of failure conditions, including failures in the middle of the voting process on the
day or days of voting.
The committee does not make a specific recommendation on the precise nature
of the appropriate backup plans, as these will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
Moreover, there are budgetary constraints on the comprehensiveness of any
contingency plan that can be put into place--jurisdictions may only be able to plan for
relatively modest problems, such as local system failures in individual precincts, rather
than for widespread failures on Election Day.
For risks to system operation involving individual polling places, one option might
be for all precincts to have available the location of a number of other precincts to which
voters might be redirected. Another option might be to have available and on call
technicians and/or a few spare voting machines in a van that could be redeployed
promptly. A third option is to ensure that a reasonable stock of hand-countable paper
ballots is created before the election and designated for use only in an emergency that
renders the original voting method unusable. With preprinting of such ballots, election
administrators would have a much easier time accounting for any hand-countable
ballots that were produced and/or used.22 Counting paper ballots is discussed in
Appendix C.
22 Still another alternative is to create paper ballots on short notice by making
arrangements with a printing firm to use special-purpose ballot stock paper, which
would make ballots easier to reconcile as compared to regular stock. Rush jobs to print
ballots on Election Day are subject to many potential difficulties, however, such as the
drying time for the ink used to print ballots. To the extent that emergency ballots can be
created ahead of time without the pressure of immediate (same-day) delivery, many
7
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To prepare for the possibility of widespread failures (i.e., voting systems made
inoperable on a large scale, whether by technology or acts of nature), election officials
need to engage in a contingency planning process focused on such a possibility.23
Almost certainly, the choices would be choices among bad alternatives, each one
disenfranchising voters to some extent. Primaries and elections for local offices, at
least, have been postponed following external disasters, as was done in New Orleans in
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and in New York City following the 9/11 attacks on
the World Trade Center.
Apart from this primary and urgent recommendation, the committee urges that to
the extent possible, jurisdictions should band together in their interactions with
vendors. With 9,500 election jurisdictions in the nation and only a handful of major
electronic voting system vendors, it is clear that the leverage of jurisdictions vis-à-vis
vendors would be increased significantly if they could present their requirements
collectively, for example as part of a negotiating consortium. Even if not, informal
information sharing (e.g., about what a vendor is willing to do for one jurisdiction) can
support efforts at moral suasion to persuade vendors to be more accommodating to
jurisdictions' needs.
Election officials should also seek information from their colleagues about
problems associated with the products of different vendors, solutions to such
problems, jurisdiction-appropriate contract provisions, backup procedures and
contingency plans, and legal and regulatory options. Since jurisdictions are
generally not in a position to undertake such research themselves, they might request
such assistance from the Election Assistance Commission and other entities in
developing a national clearinghouse and resource for information regarding election
administration. For example, these organizations could compile best practices related to
contracting with vendors for e-voting equipment and related services, develop a
database of state election laws to facilitate easy comparisons and information
exchange, and establish discussion forums for election officials in which problems and
solutions could be discussed candidly.
Finally, jurisdictions should consider engaging in parallel testing of their
voting systems on Election Day if it is feasible to do so. In parallel testing, some
such problems can be avoided.
23 A few examples can be cited of contingency/threat planning related to elections
and elected bodies. For example, Dana Debeauvoir, from Travis County, Texas,
produced a report about a planning process that was honored by the Election Center in
2005 (the package of papers is at http://electionupdates.caltech.edu/2005/12/election-
center-2005-professional.html). A second example is provided by Oregon, whose state
election code requires that each county election official file an elections security plan
annually with the Secretary of State. The plan is supposed to include a presentation of
security procedures. Third, the Continuity of Government Commission has addressed
the issue of ensuring that the Congress could reconstitute itself quickly in the aftermath
of a large-scale terrorist attack that killed or incapacitated a large number of senators
and/or representatives (see http://www.continuityofgovernment.org/report/report.html).
However, none of these efforts specifically address the question of contingency
planning for Election Day mishaps.
8
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randomly chosen systems are taken out of service and used instead in a simulated,
videotaped "election." Pre-scripted votes are entered as they would be if the machines
were in actual use, but since these votes are known, the final vote counts can be
checked for accuracy. The committee understands that many jurisdictions will not be
able to undertake parallel testing in November 2006 because of time and resource
constraints, but to the extent that such testing can occur, it would help to inform others
for the 2008 election, and if successful, might help bolster confidence in it as well.24
This recommendation holds for all jurisdictions that do not use hand-counted paper
ballots, but it is particularly important for jurisdictions that use DRE systems not
equipped to generate paper trails.
CONCLUSION
Throughout its deliberations and meetings since the start of this study in 2004,
the committee has been struck by the dedication and talent of the election officials who
have testified. Indeed, these individuals can be regarded as unsung heroes who have
kept the machinery of American democracy operating in the face of sometimes
overwhelming difficulties. But the November 2006 elections pose challenges like no
other previous one regarding reliability, usability, security, training, education, and
testing. More jurisdictions than ever before will have electronic voting systems in their
polling places. Most importantly, the waiver available for the November 2004 election
and provided by HAVA--which allowed states accepting funds for replacing punch card
and lever voting systems to postpone replacement until January 1, 2006--has expired.
In addition, the November elections appear at this point to be very close, and control of
the House or Senate might rest on the outcome of a few close races whose results
could be disputed.
However, these observations are not meant to suggest that there will be
widespread failures of electronic voting systems, that election results will be clouded by
excessive voter confusion about using new electronic voting systems, or that electronic
election fraud will necessarily occur in November. Nevertheless, the circumstances of
the November election raise the stakes for conducting elections that are regarded as
fair and that can withstand close scrutiny even in the face of unproven technology and
new election procedures. The challenges facing election officials and the nation in the
upcoming election are formidable indeed, and only time will tell if election officials
across the land will be able to succeed in the face of these challenges.
Respectfully submitted,
Dick Thornburgh and Richard Celeste, Co-chairs
Committee on a Framework for Understanding Electronic Voting
24For some additional discussion on parallel testing, see Asking the Right
Questions, pp. 78-79. Note also that parallel testing itself must be undertaken carefully
in order to minimize the possibility that test votes and real votes might be mistakenly
intermingled.
9
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APPENDIX A
MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON
A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING ELECTRONIC VOTING
DICK THORNBURGH, Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Nicholson Graham, LLP, Co-chair
RICHARD CELESTE, President, Colorado College, Co-chair
R. MICHAEL ALVAREZ, California Institute of Technology
THOMAS SHERIDAN, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (retired)
JOSEPH A. SMIALOWSKI, Freddie Mac
ANTHONY STEVENS, State of New Hampshire
PETER WEINBERGER, Google Inc.
Staff
HERBERT S. LIN, Senior Scientist and Study Director
KRISTEN BATCH, Research Associate
DAVID PADGHAM, Associate Staff Officer
BRANDYE WILLIAMS, Staff Assistant
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APPENDIX B
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE MAY 12, 2006, WORKSHOP OF
THE COMMITTEE ON A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING ELECTRONIC VOTING
Doug Chapin, Electionline.org
Donetta Davidson, U.S. Election Assistance Commission
Scott Doyle, Larimer County, Colorado
Eric Fischer, U.S. Congressional Research Service
George Gilbert, Guilford County, North Carolina
Gracia Hillman, U.S. Election Assistance Commission
Susan Inman, Pulaski County, Arkansas
Linda Lamone, Maryland State Board of Elections
Ray Martinez, U.S. Election Assistance Commission
Conny McCormack, Los Angeles County, California
Wendy Noren, Boone County, Missouri
Rene Peralta, National Institute of Standards and Technology
Ion Sancho, Leon County, Florida
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APPENDIX C
ON THE MANUAL COUNTING OF PAPER BALLOTS
Counting paper ballots is inherently manual, but there are better and worse ways
of doing it. One common method is based on ballot reading and tally marks. One
member of a two-person team reads the ballot, declaring those legal votes apparent
from the voter's marks. The second team member places a mark on his/her tally sheet
for the candidate receiving a vote. This method involves the possibility of a mistake
because the ballot is examined only once or a mistake because only one person is
doing the tallying. Since this method commonly involves reading through the entire
ballot, the ballot reader's eye and brain are not focused on looking for a single type of
data, and thus the reader must expend mental effort to distinguish among the contests
in which choices are made.
At least one state (New Hampshire), in its state recounts, has been using another
process that seems to be less subject to error. This process, based on the use of ballot
sorting and piles, involves one member of a two-person team picking up the ballots and
placing them in piles corresponding to each choice in a particular race. The other team
member observes each ballot as it is placed in a pile. After the sorting process is
complete, one team member counts each pile in stacks of 25 and then the other team
member recounts each stack. This process enables at least two persons to
simultaneously examine each ballot at least once, and to keep things simple by
identifying choices in a single race at a time. If one person makes a mistake, the other
can catch it. This method is often modified so that each ballot is rechecked during the
stack-counting process. Hence, each ballot can be seen two times by each member of
the team, for a total of up to four views of each mark on a ballot in each race. The ballot
sorting and pile method, which involves as many examinations of the same ballot as
there are contests, is noticeably faster than the ballot reading and tally mark approach.
12
Representative terms from entire chapter:
election officials